Civil Practice and Procedure by Dadak, Christopher S.
University of Richmond Law Review 
Volume 52 
Issue 1 Annual Survey 2017 Article 3 
11-1-2017 
Civil Practice and Procedure 
Christopher S. Dadak 
Associate, Guynn & Waddell, P.C., Salem, Virginia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the State and Local Government Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher S. Dadak, Civil Practice and Procedure, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1 (2017). 
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu. 
ARTICLES
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Christopher S. Dadak *
This article serves (hopefully) as a practical update on recent
changes in Virginia civil practice and procedure.' It does not at-
tempt to capture every such change, but the goal is to present the
significant points from Supreme Court of Virginia decisionS2 as
well as amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia3 and relevant statutes. Some of the discussion also focuses on
certain procedural issues that may not have significantly changed
but that a practitioner likely will not face often and could other-
wise be a fatal trap for the unwary.
I. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Res Judicata
In a 4-3 decision in Funny Guy, LLC v. Lecego, LLC, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia tackled res judicata and underscored the
* Associate, Guynn & Waddell, P.C., Salem, Virginia. J.D., 2012, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, Washington and Lee University. The author thanks
the editors and staff for their hard work on this article and volume, both specifically dedi-
cated to updates in Virginia law. The work of "spading" articles certainly is tedious and
tiresome, but it is critical to ensure the accuracy (and integrity) of scholarship, and its
value should not be overlooked.
1. Due to the publishing schedule, the article encompasses approximately a June
2016 to June 2017 timeframe.
2. For case law updates, the author reminds the reader that supreme court opinions
can easily be found (in reverse chronological order) online. Supreme Court of Virginia
Opinions, VA.'S JuD. SYs., http://www.courts.state.va.us/scndex.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2017).
3. Amendments to the rules are readily available online. Rules of the Supreme Court
of Virginia, VA.'S Ju. SYs., http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rules.html (last visit-
ed Sept. 27, 2017).
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importance of a party pleading all of its potential claims (in the
alternative if necessary). 4 The plaintiffs, The Funny Guy, LLC,
and Mark Goldstein (collectively "Funny Guy"), alleged that the
defendants, Lecego, LLC, and Vision-It, Inc., and their respective
owners (collectively "Lecego"), failed to pay Funny Guy for the
work it performed.5
The supreme court summarized Funny Guy's claims as three
theories of recovery: that Lecego had agreed to pay a certain
amount to settle the dispute ("the settlement theory"); that there
was a binding oral contract between the parties ("the oral-
contract theory"); and, alternatively, even without a contract,
Funny Guy was entitled to be paid for its services ("the quantum-
meruit theory").6 In 2014, Funny Guy sued Lecego under the first
theory of recovery, and the Fairfax County Circuit Court dis-
missed the suit on demurrer, finding there was "no meeting of the
minds as a matter of law."7 Less than a year later, Funny Guy
filed suit against Lecego under the oral-contract theory and, in
the alternative, under the quantum-meruit theory.8 In response,
Lecego filed a plea in bar of res judicata, contending that "these
alternative theories of recovery could have been, and thus should
have been, asserted in the first suit."9 The circuit court agreed
and dismissed the second action with prejudice.1 0
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the circuit court in
its application of Rule 1:6 in that it "prohibited Funny Guy from
filing two separate lawsuits when one would have been perfectly
sufficient."" Funny Guy had argued that the oral-contract and
quantum-meruit theories were "wholly separate disputes" from
the settlement theory. 12 The supreme court disagreed and noted
that the argument came "uncomfortably close" to the "same evi-
dence" test from Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., which had been
"expressly rejected" by Rule 1:6.13
4. 293 Va. 135, 795 S.E.2d 887 (2017).
5. Id. at 140, 795 S.E.2d at 889.
6. Id. at 139-40, 795 S.E.2d at 888.
7. Id. at 140, 795 S.E.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 140, 795 S.E.2d at 889.
9. Id. at 140, 795 S.E.2d at 889.
10. Id. at 140, 795 S.E.2d at 889.
11. Id. at 141, 795 S.E.2d at 889; Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:6 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
12. Id. at 141, 795 S.E.2d at 889.
13. Id. at 141, 795 S.E.2d at 889 (citing Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., 265 Va. 159,
2 [Vol. 52:1
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The court went on to elucidate the origins of res judicata and
its appearance "in nearly every legal system."14 "For all of the le-
gal argot making the doctrine sound tiresomely erudite, the
thought is really no more complicated than saying that, as Henry
Black put it, litigants must 'make the most of their day in
court."' 15 The supreme court further quoted Kent Sinclair, saying,
"The law should afford one full, fair hearing relating to a particu-
lar problem-but not two."1 6 It also discussed how res judicata in-
cludes "both issue and claim preclusion," as well as the character-
istics, origins, and evolution of both.17
"As modern pleading reforms loosened the procedural limita-
tions on res judicata, this Court, ironically, tightened the historic
scope of the merger-bar principles of the doctrine."1 8 The previ-
ously referenced Davis v. Marshall Homes decision "adopted a
strict view of the same-evidence test that was wholly out of sync
with the prior, far broader, same-subject-matter test."1 9 The same
evidence test simply compared the evidence required to prove the
claims (and their elements) and as long as the claims required
"different, though related, fact patterns," then res judicata would
not apply "even if the claims all arise out of the same underlying
dispute."20 The supreme court noted and discussed the subse-
quent criticism of the decision, even stating that "[t]hough harsh,
such criticisms were not unfair."21 Three years after that decision,
the supreme court implemented Rule 1:6, which "parallels the
'same transactions or occurrence' scope" of Virginia Code sections
8.01-272 and 8.01-281.22 "[I]f the underlying dispute produces dif-
ferent legal claims that can be joined in a single suit under the
joinder statutes, Rule 1:6 provides that they should be joined un-
less a judicially-recognized exception to res judicata exists."23
166-68, 576 S.E.2d 504, 507-08, 510 (2003)).
14. Id. at 141-42 & nn.4-7, 795 S.E.2d at 889-90 & nn.4-7 (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 143, 795 S.E.2d at 890 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 143, 795 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting KENT SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO VIRGINIA LAW:
EQUITY REFORM AND OTHER LANDMARK CHANGES § 11.01 (2006)).
17. Id. at 142-43, 795 S.E.2d at 890 (citation omitted).
18. Id. at 148, 795 S.E.2d at 894.
19. Id. at 148, 795 S.E.2d at 894.
20. Id. at 148-49, 795 S.E.2d at 894.
21. Id. at 149, 795 S.E.2d at 894.
22. Id. at 150, 795 S.E.2d at 895.
23. Id. at 150, 795 S.E.2d at 895. The court provided examples of exemptions to res
judicata such as non-final judgments, dismissals due to lack of jurisdiction or improper
venue, misjoinder, nonjoinder, nonsuits, dismissals without prejudice, and the "unique
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The supreme court also discussed several statutes and rules
that encourage parties to bring their claims all at once. Virginia
Code section 8.01-272 allows a plaintiff to "join multiple claims in
the same proceeding (including those, like tort and contract
claims, which he previously could not join) so long as they 'arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence."'2 4 The supreme court
further noted that Virginia Code section 8.01-281(A) and Rule
1.4(K) allow a plaintiff to "plead alternative facts and theo-
ries of recovery." 25 It emphasized the "broad scope of joinder in
Virginia."26
Leaning on the Second Restatement of Judgments, the su-
preme court established a "practical analysis" of applying res ju-
dicata that focused on "whether the facts are related in time,
space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the par-
ties' expectations or business understanding or usage." 2 7 No fac-
tor is "indispensable or determinative," but instead should "be
considered 'pragmatically' with a view toward uncovering the
true underlying dispute between the parties."28 The supreme
court found that each of the factors "support[ed] the trial court's
application of res judicata in this case."29 'Most litigants, we be-
lieve, would view all three of Funny Guy's alternative claims as
arising out of 'a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative
facts."'30
The majority was not convinced by Funny Guy's and the dis-
sent's attempts to separate out the alleged settlement agreement
and the underlying work. The court did not consider the three
percent difference between the purported settlement amount and
the claimed amount of damages indicative of two different dis-
putes (and claims) because the smaller figure was simply a
contexts of property and personal injury damage," which are statutorily permitted to be
brought separately. Id. at 150 n.15, 795 S.E.2d at 895 n.15.
24. Id. at 151, 795 S.E.2d at 895 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-272 (Repl. Vol. 2015 &
Cum. Supp. 2017)).
25. Id. at 151-52, 795 S.E.2d at 895.
26. Id. at 151, 795 S.E.2d at 895.
27. Id. at 154, 795 S.E.2d at 897 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 24(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
28. Id. at 154-55, 795 S.E.2d at 897 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§§ 24 cmt. b, 24(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
29. Id. at 155, 795 S.E.2d at 897.
30. Id. at 156, 795 S.E.2d at 898 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
[Vol. 52:14
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"'showing of good faith' during negotiations." 31 "The only dispute
between Funny Guy and Lecego was, and is, Funny Guy wanting
to get paid for .its work." 3 2 The majority also did not find the al-
leged non-monetary settlement provisions sufficient to separate
that settlement theory from the other two theories; "[m]ore im-
portantly, none of these non-monetary provisions changed the es-
sential character of the purported settlement agreement."33
The supreme court concluded by stressing that the holding in
this case is specific to its unique facts. Therefore, the supreme
court does not believe that the case exposes settling parties to
face both litigation of the breach and "the underlying claim with
all of its evidentiary burdens and litigation expenses." 34 To the
majority, there was a unique commonality between the settle-
ment amount and the underlying damages, one that is unlikely to
apply to "common-law tort claims, statutory rights of action, or
constitutional claims." 3 5 The majority also argued that the com-
monality issue will also only come into play when "the defendant
disputes the very existence of the settlement agreement." 36
If the parties accept the settlement agreement as a legally enforcea-
ble meeting of the minds, but merely dicker among themselves over
whether it was breached, there would be no reason to assert an al-
ternative claim that presupposed the settlement agreement did not
legally exist because neither party would be making that assertion. 37
Justice Mims, joined by Justices Goodwyn and McCullough,
dissented. The dissent began by admitting that it disagrees with
the majority on one key issue: "[T]hat there is only one dispute
31. Id. at 156, 795 S.E.2d at 898.
32. Id. at 156, 795 S.E.2d at 898 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 157, 795 S.E.2d at 899 (emphasis added). The court highlighted that the
agreement was for "full accord and satisfaction for any and all claims now know[n] or
known in the future against any party for the work performed by [Funny Guy] on the Con-
tract." Id. at 157, 795 S.E.2d at 899 (alterations in original).
34. Id. at 159, 795 S.E.2d at 900.
35. Id. at 159, 795 S.E.2d at 900. The commonality distinction seems to be splitting
hairs too fine. Every settlement amount will have commonality with the underlying dam-
ages, and philosophically it is unclear why a "good faith" 3% difference is insignificant as
opposed to, for example, 10% or 30% (or wherever the line is ultimately drawn). However,
the majority appears correct that the "direct" commonality issue will have limited poten-
tial application, likely only to breach of contract actions such as the one at issue here.
36. Id. at 160, 795 S.E.2d at 900.
37. Id. at 160, 795 S.E.2d at 900. As the dissent saliently points out, a plaintiff may
not know if the defendant is denying the existence of a settlement agreement until the de-
fendant files a responsive pleading. Id. at 165 n.3, 795 S.E.2d at 903 n.3 (Mims, J., dis-
senting).
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here."38 The dissent believes that Funny Guy "alleged two wholly
separate, though sequential, disputes, and they arise from differ-
ent conduct, transactions, or occurrences." 39 Specifically, "[t]he
settlement agreement is not part of the same transaction as the
oral agreement."40 The dissent persuasively states,
The consideration for [Lecego] from the oral agreement was the work
Funny Guy promised to perform; the consideration for [Lecego] from
the settlement agreement was Funny guy's release of its claim that
[Lecego] breached the oral agreement, its promise not to disparage
them, and its withdrawal of the critical correspondence sent to third
parties.4 1
The dissent also argued that the claims could not arise out of the
same occurrence because the oral-contract and quantum-meruit
theories accrued after a breach of that agreement, whereas the
settlement theory claim did not accrue until much later pursuant
to a breach of an alleged settlement agreement. 42 In addition to
these distinctions, the dissent gave much greater weight to the
non-monetary provisions of the alleged settlement agreement. 43
Accordingly, the underlying conduct (and expectations) for the
underlying theories were not the same. 44
The practical takeaway, particularly for breach-of-contract ac-
tions that also involve a subsequent settlement agreement, is
that a plaintiff should make sure to allege all potential theories of
recovery against the defendant, including any underlying claims.
It is unclear from the opinion why Funny Guy waited to bring the
second action. One would expect that the circuit court would have
granted a motion by Funny Guy for leave to amend the complaint
and allege the other two theories of recovery in the original ac-
tion, which would have saved those theories.
38. Id. at 161, 795 S.E.2d at 901 (Mims, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 161, 795 S.E.2d at 901.
40. Id. at 162, 795 S.E.2d at 901.
41. Id. at 162, 795 S.E.2d at 901. And this argument particularly highlights the weak-
ness of the commonality analysis by the majority.
42. Id. at 163, 795 S.E.2d at 902.
43. Id. at 162 n.1, 795 S.E.2d at 901-02 n..
44. Id. at 163, 795 S.E.2d at 902.
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B. Attorney's Fees
In Lambert v. Sea Oats Condominium Ass'n, the Supreme
Court of Virginia provided additional guidance for courts on ap-
propriate factors to consider in awarding attorney's fees. 45
Martha Lambert ("Lambert"), a condominium unit owner, sued
her condominium association (the "Association") for $500 for fail-
ing to repair an exterior door to her unit.46 The suit in general
district court "alleged that the door was a common element and
that the Association bore the burden of repairing it under the As-
sociation's declaration, its bylaws, and Code §§ 55-79.41 and 55-
79.79(A)."47 She sought $500 for the repairs and her attorney's
fees. 48 The general district court ruled in favor of the Association,
and Lambert appealed to the Virginia Beach City Circuit Court,
still seeking $500 in damages plus her incurred attorney's fees. 49
During closing argument at trial in the circuit court, Lambert's
counsel "reminded the court that [Lambert] was seeking an
award of attorney's fees and supplied an affidavit stating that
$8232.00 had been incurred."50 Counsel further advised the court
that the defendant had not reviewed the affidavit and "requested
a later hearing under Rule 3:25 to determine the reasonableness
of the amount she sought."5 1 The Association did not make any
objections and moved to its closing argument. 52 The court found
in Lambert's favor, awarding her $500 in damages and "asked the
Association how much time it needed to review Lambert's attor-
ney's fees affidavit and expressed its preference that the parties
respond in writing rather than holding a hearing."5 3 The parties
agreed that the Association would file a response within three
weeks, and Lambert would respond within a week thereafter. 54
45. 293 Va. 245, 798 S.E.2d 177 (2017). Specifically, the court gave guidance when
attorney's fees are provided for by statute or contract as opposed to sanctions.
46. Id. at 248, 798 S.E.2d at 179.
47. Id. at 248, 798 S.E.2d at 179.
48. Id. at 248, 798 S.E.2d at 179-80.
49. Id. at 248, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
50. Id. at 248, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
51. Id. at 248, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
52. Id. at 248, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
53. Id. at 249, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
54. Id. at 249, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
2017] 7
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In its submission, the Association argued that Lambert had to
prove her attorney's fees during her prima facie case.55 Because
Lambert introduced the affidavit in her closing argument, after
she had rested, she had failed to establish a prima facie case of
attorney's fees, and none could be awarded to her.56 The Associa-
tion also contended that since Lambert's attorney's fees were six-
teen times the judgment, the Supreme Court of Virginia's deci-
sion in West Square, L.L.C. v. Communication Technologies,
where an award of attorney's fees was reduced from over twice
the judgment amount to less than a third,57 required a similar re-
sult in the instant case.58 Finally, the brief noted that the fees
improperly included staff work, duplicative work, and work in a
prior lawsuit brought by Lambert.59
"The court thereafter issued an opinion letter, without waiting
for Lambert's reply to the Association's response, awarding Lam-
bert only $375 in attorney's fees and asking her to prepare and
circulate a final order."60 Lambert filed a reply anyway and ar-
gued: "(1) attorney's fees are often decided after a ruling on the
merits, (2) nothing requires the presentation of evidence of attor-
ney's fees before the merits have been decided, and (3) in any
event, the Association had agreed to the procedure for deciding
attorney's fees that the court had proposed at trial."6 1 Lambert
further argued that Virginia law did not tie reasonable attorney's
fees to the judgment amount and that doing so would undermine
the statutory recovery of attorney's fees.62 Lambert did concede,
however, that there was duplicative work and eliminated those
fees (thereby reducing the original amount), but she also request-
ed fees incurred since trial, which led to an actual increase in the
outstanding attorney's fees.63
55. Id. at 249, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
56. Id. at 249, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
57. 274 Va. 425, 432, 649 S.E.2d 698, 701 (2007).
58. Lambert, 293 Va. at 249, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
59. Id. at 249, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
60. Id. at 249, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
61. Id. at 249-50, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
62. See id. at 250, 798 S.E.2d at 180-81. This "would undermine this legislative intent
[of encouraging private parties to litigate this issue] because private parties would not un-
dertake private enforcement litigation where the money damages were small if they had to
pay attorney's fees out of pocket." Id. at 250, 798 S.E.2d at 181.
63. See id. at 250, 798 S.E.2d at 181.
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"The court responded with a letter stating that it had reviewed
Lambert's reply and was renewing its award of only $375 in at-
torney's fees." 6 4 Lambert then filed a motion to reconsider on
which the court held a hearing.65 The court again awarded only
$375 in attorney's fees but stated that it "felt compelled to impose
a relationship between the amount in controversy and the level to
which [it] was going to require the defendant to pay the fees."6 6
Lambert appealed, and the Association filed an assignment of
cross-error.67
The supreme court noted that it has "expressly identified seven
factors for courts to consider when weighing the reasonableness
of an amount of attorney's fees." 68 These factors are:
[(1)] the time and effort expended by the attorney, [(2)] the nature of
the services rendered, [(3)] the complexity of the services, [(4)] the
value of the services to the client, [(5)] the results obtained, [(6)]
whether the fees incurred were consistent with those generally
charged for similar services, and [(7)] whether the services were nec-
essary and appropriate.69
The supreme court concluded that the amount of damages award-
ed falls under the fifth factor-results obtained.70 However, it dis-
tinguished Swank v. Reherd,71 and stated that there it "did not
calculate [the attorney's] reasonable compensation by dividing
the plaintiffs' judgment by their ad damnum to arrive at a per-
centage."72
Thus, the purpose of comparing the damages awarded to the damag-
es sought is to ensure that the ad damnum is reasonable in relation
to the cause of action, thereby defusing the litigation arms race that
unreasonably high claims for damages may provoke, rather than to
handicap plaintiffs in pursuing a full recovery. 73
64. Id. at 250, 798 S.E.2d at 181.
65. Id. at 250, 798 S.E.2d at 181.
66. Id. at 251, 798 S.E.2d at 181. The court also noted that Lambert's counsel "did a
magnificent job." Id. at 251, 798 S.E.2d at 181. However, the court "didn't think it was
right to impose that kind of attorney's fees in a case where the amount in controversy was
$500." Id. at 251, 798 S.E.2d at 181.
67. Id. at 251, 798 S.E.2d at 181.
68. Id. at 254, 798 S.E.2d at 183.
69. Id. at 254, 798 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v.
Batt, 284 Va. 409, 430, 732 S.E.2d 690, 703 (2012)).
70. See id. at 255-56, 798 S.E.2d at 184.
71. 181 Va. 943, 27 S.E.2d 191 (1943).
72. Lambert, 293 Va. at 255-56, 798 S.E.2d at 184.
73. Id. at 256, 798 S.E.2d at 184.
2017] 9
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
"However, the 'results obtained' factor does not permit courts to
do what the circuit court did here-i.e., to use the amount of
damages sought as a limit beyond which no attorney's fees will be
awarded."74 To hold otherwise would mean plaintiffs in smaller
value cases can never hope to actually recover their attorney's
fees.75 Failing to adequately award fees "deprives the parties of
the benefit of their bargain if the fee-shifting provision is contrac-
tual and contravenes the intent of the General Assembly if the
provision is statutory." 76
The supreme court also addressed the Association's cross-error
that Lambert failed to introduce evidence of her fees in her prima
facie case and that she "did not give any notice of the amount of
attorney's fees she sought because she only indicated that she
would seek an award, without specifying any specific amount in
her pleadings or responses to pre-trial discovery."77 Because the
Association did not object to the introduction of the affidavit, it
could not argue that the circuit court could not consider the affi-
davit as it was introduced after Lambert had rested.78 However,
more importantly, the supreme court clarified that a party seek-
ing attorney's fees as the prevailing party does not have the bur-
den of proving attorney's fees in its case-in-chief.79 Instead, "it is
often appropriate to delay the issue of awarding attorney's fees
until the disposition on the merits reveals which party has actu-
ally prevailed, and on which claims."80 But it is important to note
here that while Rule 3:25(D) allows a court "to establish a proce-
dure to adjudicate any claim for attorney's fees," the rule does
specify that this be done "in advance of trial."81 Finally, due to the
"countless variables" involved, the supreme court dismissed the
Association's argument that Lambert had to provide advance no-
tice of the actual amount of attorney's fees.82
74. Id. at 257, 798 S.E.2d at 184.
75. Id. at 257, 798 S.E.2d at 184.
76. Id. at 258, 798 S.E.2d at 185.
77. Id. at 259-60, 798 S.E.2d at 186.
78. Id. at 259 n.9, 798 S.E.2d at 186 n.9.
79. Id. at 260, 798 S.E.2d at 186-87.
80. Id. at 260, 798 S.E.2d at 187.
81. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:25(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017). The court noted that the Association had
not objected to the court establishing the procedure at the conclusion of trial. Lambert, 293
Va. at 248, 798 S.E.2d at 180.
82. Lambert, 293 Va. at 261, 798 S.E.2d at 187. However, this seems limited to the
issue on appeal in a fairly minor case. It seems unlikely that the court intended to hold
that a party does not have to provide such information when requested in discovery and
[Vol. 52:110
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This decision makes clear that a court cannot cut attorney's
fees solely because the amount in controversy is small-or even
de minimis. The judgment amount can play into the court's anal-
ysis of whether the attorney's time was reasonable or the repre-
sentation effective, but cannot serve as an arbitrary ceiling for
the attorney's fees themselves. Historically, courts, particularly
at the general district level, have been reluctant to award attor-
ney's fees exceeding the damages for precisely the same reason
elucidated by the circuit court in this case.83 However, this deci-
sion aims to eliminate that hesitation.
C. Standing
In Ricketts v. Strange, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued a
decision on standing for a plaintiff that failed to disclose a per-
sonal injury cause of action or claim in her Chapter 7 bankrupt-
cy. 84 In February 2012, Sheryl Denise Ricketts ("Ricketts") was in
a car accident and subsequently suffered radiating neck and back
pain, which ultimately resulted in her undergoing surgery.85 In
January 2014, close to, but before the statute of limitations ex-
pired, she filed suit in circuit court alleging negligence and result-
ing personal injury damages.86 The defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing that Ricketts lacked standing be-
cause in September 2012, when she filed for Chapter 7 bankrupt-
cy, she had failed to exempt her personal-injury claim from the
bankruptcy estate.87 Ricketts disagreed, but also filed motions to
change the plaintiff to the bankruptcy trustee by either amending
under a misnomer theory or as a proper plaintiff pursuant to Rule
3:17.88 The circuit court denied Ricketts's motions and granted
readily available (with the obvious caveat that the figure could change).
83. See, e.g., West Square, L.L.C. v. Commc'n Techs., 274 Va. 425, 432-35, 649 S.E.2d
698, 701-03 (2007) (upholding a circuit court's ruling that reduced the award for attor-
ney's fees when the fee was twice the amount of damages to less than a third of the
amount of damages). '"[T]he total cost, which is over $80,000 in attorneys' fees, over $5,000
in expenses, is certainly a figure that is too high for this case. I would be remiss not to go
on the record saying that.' The circuit court found the amount of attorneys' fees and costs
requested by West Square 'to be exorbitant ... consider[ing] the amount sued for."' Id. at
432, 649 S.E.2d at 701.
84. 293 Va. 101, 112, 796 S.E.2d 182, 188 (2017).
85. Id. at 104, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
86. Id. at 104, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
87. Id. at 104-05, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
88. Id. at 105-06, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
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summary judgment in favor of the defendant.8 9 Ricketts then ap-
pealed.90
The majority of the opinion dealt with the issue of whether
Ricketts had properly exempted her personal-injury claim. Ques-
tion 18 of Schedule B of the mandatory bankruptcy schedules re-
quires the debtor to list any "liquidated debts . . . including tax re-
funds."91 Ricketts disclosed the following:
Potential funds due to Debtor unknown at this time, including State
& Federal tax refunds, 9/12 interest in joint 2012 tax refund of ap-
proximately $9700=$7274, debtor V2 interes[t] = $3638, possible gar-
nishment funds, insurance proceeds, proceeds related to claims or
causes of action that may be asserted by the debtor, any claim for
earned but unpaid wages, and/or inheritance. 92
Meanwhile Question 21 of Schedule B requests "[o]ther contin-
gent and unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax re-
funds, counterclaims of the debtor, and rights to setoff claims," to
which Ricketts responded: "None." 93
Ricketts did appear to concede that her cause of action would
have been better disclosed under Question 21, rather than Ques-
tion 18.94 However, she nonetheless argued that her disclosure
under Question 18 was sufficient to exempt her personal-injury
claim.95 The supreme court disagreed.
The supreme court began its opinion with a basic explanation
of the bankruptcy process and emphasized that a debtor's "legal
and equitable interests" in pre-petition property "become a part of
the bankruptcy estate, under the control of the trustee."9 6 "This
includes a debtor's 'causes of action which are pending in court,'
and 'those which are only inchoate claims at the time of filing."'97
The court also explained how and why a debtor can exempt as-
sets, including the required process of listing it in Schedule B and
89. Id. at 106, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
90. Id. at 106, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
91. Id. at 105, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
92. Id. at 105, 796 S.E.2d at 184 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 105, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
94. Id. at 110, 796 S.E.2d at 186-87.
95. Id. at 106, 796 S.E.2d at 184.
96. Id. at 106, 796 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting Kocher v. Campbell, 282 Va. 113, 117, 712
S.E.2d 477, 479 (2011)).
97. Id. at 106, 796 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting Kocher, 282 Va. at 117, 712 S.E.2d at 479)
(emphasis added).
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"then claim[ing] it as exempt property on his Schedule C."98 Oth-
erwise, by default, the asset becomes "a part of the bankruptcy
estate [and] . . . remains so, and is enforceable solely by the trus-
tee."99 Critically, "the trustee alone has standing" to bring a claim
or cause of action that is part of the bankruptcy estate.100
The supreme court was called upon to "consider the level of
specificity with which an asset must be identified in a debtor's
schedules to exempt it from the bankruptcy estate."101 The court
provided a thorough analysis of a trustee's purpose and responsi-
bilities, and the importance of full and accurate disclosures to the
bankruptcy process. 102 "Therefore, a debtor's description of his as-
sets and exemptions must contain sufficient detail to enable the
trustee to determine whether further investigation into a claimed
exemption is warranted."103 The supreme court was not im-
pressed with Ricketts's disclosure. It described her exemption as
"overly general at best and boilerplate at worst," resulting in "no
useful information that would lead the trustee to discover the
claim against [the defendant]."10 4 While the court declined to pro-
vide a "bright-line rule," it emphasized that an exemption "must
contain sufficient detail to lead the trustee to the claim ultimately
asserted."105
The supreme court also made quick work of Ricketts's argu-
ments regarding misnomer and "proper plaintiff' under Rule
3:17. The trustee could not be substituted pursuant to a misno-
mer because "a misnomer is a mistake in the name, not the iden-
tification of a party."106 The trustee was the "right person," but
"he was not incorrectly named." 107 Instead, the complaint named
the "wrong person"-Ricketts-which did not constitute a mis-
nomer.108 Meanwhile, Rule 3:17 could not be applied because it
98. Id. at 107, 796 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting Kocher, 282 Va. at 118, 712 S.E.2d at 480).
99. Id. at 107, 796 S.E.2d at 185.
100. Id. at 106-07, 796 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting Nat'1 Am. Ins. Co. v. Ruppert Landscap-
ing Co., 187 F.3d 439, 441 (4th Cir. 1999)).
101. Id. at 107, 796 S.E.2d at 185.
102. Id. at 108, 796 S.E.2d at 186.
103. Id. at 108, 796 S.E.2d at 186.
104. Id. at 109, 796 S.E.2d at 186.
105. Id. at 110, 796 S.E.2d at 187.
106. Id. at 108, 796 S.E.2d at 186 (quoting Richmond v. Volk, 291 Va. 60, 64, 781
S.E.2d 191, 193 (2016)).
107. Id. at 111, 796 S.E.2d at 187.
108. Id. at 111, 796 S.E.2d at 187.
132017]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
applies only to plaintiffs who "become[] incapable," and Ricketts
was "incapable of prosecuting her claim since it was filed."109
This case is a lesson in the pitfalls of a disconnect where a cli-
ent's bankruptcy and plaintiff litigation overlap. For bankruptcy
practitioners, it is important to verify and nail down what, if any,
potential claims or causes of action the client or debtor may have.
Failing to find and exempt these claims and causes of action can
ultimately be quite detrimental to the client. Meanwhile, for
plaintiffs' attorneys, it is imperative to check the bankruptcy peti-
tions and verify that your client properly exempted the claim (and
the value assigned to it)110 if the client declared bankruptcy after
the cause of action accrued.
D. Failure to Preserve the Issue
In Verizon Online LLC v. Horbal, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia highlighted the importance (and potential pitfalls) of preserv-
ing issues for appellate review.111 Verizon Online, LLC ("Verizon")
argued, in Chesterfield County, that its set top boxes were "in-
tangible personal property" exempt from local taxation under
Virginia Code section 58.1-1101(A)(2a) and that it was entitled to
refunds for prior tax years. 112 The local tax exemption portion of
the decision is not germane to this article's focus; however, pre-
serving the refund issue for appellate review is illustrative in
Virginia procedure.
On December 28, 2010, by letter to Joseph A. Horbal ("Hor-
bal"), Commissioner of the Revenue for Chesterfield County, Ver-
izon "initiated its local appeal of the 2008, 2009, and 2010 tax as-
109. Id. at 111, 796 S.E.2d at 187 (emphasis added). Even though this disposed of the
issue, the supreme court still addressed Ricketts's reliance on Jacobson v. Southern Bis-
cuit Co., 198 Va. 813, 817, 97 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1957), which liberally allowed substituting par-
ties (including plaintiffs) "if the substituted party bears a real relation of interest to the
original party and no new cause of action is introduced." Ricketts, 293 Va. at 111, 796
S.E.2d at 187 (quoting Chesapeake House on the Bay, Inc. v. Va. Nat'l Bank, 231 Va. 440,
442, 344 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1986)). However, when the original plaintiff (i.e., the one need-
ing to be substituted) lacks standing, "the sole remedy is a nonsuit followed by a new ac-
tion brought in the name of the proper plaintiff." Ricketts, 293 Va. at 111-12, 796 S.E.2d
at 187-88 (quoting Chesapeake House on the Bay, 231 Va. at 443, 344 S.E.2d at 915).
110. The importance of the assigned value lies in the fact that there is a strong argu-
ment that the ad damnum in the subsequent and related litigation cannot be higher than
the value assigned to it in the bankruptcy proceeding.
111. 293 Va. 176, 796 S.E.2d 409 (2017).
112. Id. at 179, 796 S.E.2d at 410.
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sessments" on its set top boxes. 113 On January 28, 2011, Horbal
responded to Verizon and indicated that its appeal was "incom-
plete" and that it would not be considered until it complied with
Virginia Code section 58.1-3983.1(B)(2).114 Verizon subsequently
amended its appeal by June 22, 2011.116 On July 14, 2011, Horbal
issued a "Final Local Determination" where he denied Verizon's
appeal deeming it "complete" and "qualifying as a local appeal." 116
Verizon administratively appealed Horbal's determination with
the Tax Commissioner.1 1 7 Chesterfield County filed a response
arguing the merits (that set top boxes are subject to local taxa-
tion) but "did not raise any issue regarding the timeliness of Veri-
zon's local appeal or assert that the Tax Commissioner was with-
out jurisdiction to hear the matter." 18
The Tax Commissioner ruled in favor of Verizon, holding that
the set top boxes were exempt from local taxes and remanded for
the county to issue refunds for 2008 through 2010.119 Horbal then
"filed an application for judicial review of the determination of
the Tax Commissioner in the circuit court pursuant to Code §§
58.1-3983.1(G), -3984."120 In addition to arguing the merits, Hor-
bal contended that the Tax Commissioner did not have jurisdic-
tion to order refunds as to 2008 and 2009 because Verizon failed
to timely file its local appeal.121 The circuit court ruled in favor of
Verizon as to its set top boxes but agreed with Horbal as to the
refunds and found that Verizon had failed to timely file its local
appeal. 122 Horbal appealed the determination of tax exemption
and Verizon appealed that it was not owed refunds due to un-
timely local appeals. 123
The thrust of Verizon's argument was that the "issue regarding
the timeliness of Verizon's local appeal was not presented to the
Tax Commissioner and, therefore, was waived."1 24 The supreme
113. Id. at 185, 796 S.E.2d at 413.
114. Id. at 185, 796 S.E.2d at 413.
115. Id. at 185, 796 S.E.2d at 413-14.
116. Id. at 185, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
117. Id. at 185, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
118. Id. at 185, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
119. Id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
120. Id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 185-86, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
122. Id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
123. Id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
124. Id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
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court agreed. 125 It noted that in a proceeding pursuant to Virginia
Code section 58.1-3983.1(G), "the circuit court acts in the role of
an appellate court."1 26 Because "principles of procedural de-
fault ... apply to determinations of the Tax Commissioner judi-
cially challenged[,] . . . issues not argued in the proceedings before
the Tax Commissioner ... may not be argued as a basis for rever-
sal."127
The court also clarified that the local appeal deadline is not a
subject matter jurisdiction issue "that may be raised at any
time."1 2 8 It reiterated that it recently "distinguished between the
element of subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any
point in the proceedings, and other elements of jurisdiction that
are subject to waiver if not properly raised."1 29 Because they had
previously concluded that a thirty-day filing requirement for judi-
cial review of a board of zoning appeal by a circuit court was not
subject matter jurisdiction, the same logic applied to the local ap-
peal deadline in this instance. The local appeal deadline was "an
other jurisdictional element subject to waiver if not properly
raised."130 Horbal had failed to timely raise the local appeal dead-
line and had waived the issue.1 31
This decision emphasizes the need to fully analyze and raise all
affirmative defenses, including filing deadlines, at the onset of
the case. This is of particular importance in administrative or
agency matters where it is easy to forget that the circuit court ju-
dicial review is appellate review (and not an opportunity for a
mulligan).
125. Id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
126. Id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
127. Id. at 187, 796 S.E.2d at 414-15.
128. Id. at 188, 796 S.E.2d at 415.
129. Id. at 188, 796 S.E.2d at 415 (citing Bd. of Supervisors v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
271 Va. 336, 343-48, 626 S.E.2d 374, 378-81 (2006)).
130. Id. at 188, 796 S.E.2d at 415 (quoting Bd. of Supervisors, 271 Va. at 347, 626
S.E.2d at 381). The supreme court also noted that Virginia Code section 8.01-235 "re-
move[d] jurisdictional considerations affecting subject matter jurisdiction from the appli-
cation of statutory limitation periods." Id. at 188 n.14, 796 S.E.2d at 415 n.14 (citing W.
HAMILTON BRYSON, BRYSON ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.03[8] [k] [ii], at 6-53 to 6-54
(4th ed. 2004)).
131. Id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
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E. Sanctions
This article would not be complete without a case on an issue
that always garners attention: sanctions. In Westlake Legal
Group v. Flynn, the Supreme Court of Virginia not only affirmed
the circuit court's award of attorney's fees, but also remanded to
the circuit court to award additional attorney's fees for the ap-
peal. 132
Eileen Flynn ("Fynn") retained Plofchan & Associates, which
ultimately became Westlake Legal Group ("Westlake"), as her
counsel for a domestic-relations case.133 Flynn signed a "represen-
tation agreement" which provided Westlake with several reme-
dies in the event Flynn failed to pay. 134 The agreement provided
that: "[I]n the event the firm should be required to institute legal
proceedings against [Flynn] for sums due under the agreement,
the firm would be its own attorney and [Flynn] would be respon-
sible for its fees in collection proceedings at a $400 hourly rate."1 35
The agreement also stated that if Flynn failed to pay a bill within
forty-five days, "her entire account would be due and accrue in-
terest at an annual rate of 18%."136 Finally, the agreement also
included a confession-of-judgment clause that appointed one of
two Westlake attorneys as Flynn's attorney-in-fact authorized to
confess judgment against Flynn "for the entire unpaid balance
due under the agreement." 137
On April 30, 2014, Westlake billed Flynn for $8,910.07 and on
June 5, 2014, for $550 in legal fees.138 Both bills were mailed to
Flynn at a Purcellville, Virginia, address. 39 On June 6, 2014, a
Westlake attorney acting as attorney-in-fact for Flynn "filed a
confession of judgment against her in the clerk's office of the Cir-
cuit Court of Loudoun County in the amount of $9,460.07, with
interest at 18% from April 30, 2014."140 The confession noted
Flynn's address as "21804 Cresent [sic] Park Square, Broadlands,
132. 293 Va. 344, 353, 798 S.E.2d 187, 191 (2017).
133. Id. at 347, 798 S.E.2d at 188.
134. Id. at 347, 798 S.E.2d at 188.
135. Id. at 347, 798 S.E.2d at 188.
136. Id. at 347, 798 S.E.2d at 188.
137. Id. at 347, 798 S.E.2d at 188 (noting the agreement contained the warning re-
quired by Virginia Code section 8.01-433.1).
138. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 188.
139. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 188.
140. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 188.
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VA 20148."141 The clerk entered the judgment and pursuant to
Virginia Code section 8.01-438 issued a certified copy of the
judgment to be served on Flynn.142 On June 10, 2014, the sheriff
returned the judgment as "not found" and noted a "misspelled
street address." 143 On appeal it was "undisputed that no copy of
the judgment was ever served on [Flynn]."l4 4
On March 18, 2015, Westlake filed a garnishment against
Flynn, "this time giving her address as '2221 Hunters Run Dr.,
Reston, VA 20191."'145 Flynn retained (different) counsel who
moved the circuit court to quash the confessed judgment and
have it declared void nunc pro tunc due to it not being served
within sixty days, as required by Virginia Code section 8.01-
483.146 Westlake moved for a voluntary nonsuit while Flynn
moved for an award of her attorney's fees. 147
At a hearing on September 4, 2015, the court entered four orders: (1)
granting the nonsuit, (2) quashing the confessed judgment nunc pro
tunc, (3) ordering payment to [Flynn] of all sums held by the clerk by
reason of the garnishment, and (4) pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1,
awarding sanctions in the amount of $1,805 .. . to [Flynn] as reason-
able expenses she incurred by reason of the garnishment proceed-
ings.148
Westlake appealed and presented six assignments of error, of
which the court considered five.1 49
Westlake primarily argued that the circuit court lacked juris-
diction to impose sanctions. Westlake contended that the "volun-
tary nonsuit had the effect of depriving the court of jurisdiction:
'Because the underlying judgment ha[d] been dismissed, the cir-
cuit court lost jurisdiction to enter a judgment in the garnishment
action."' 50 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed. It first noted
that confessed judgments are "creatures of statute" and "to the
141. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 188 (alteration in original).
142. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 188.
143. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 188-89.
144. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 189.
145. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 189. The court noted that Westlake had argued in its
brief that the address for the confessed judgment and the garnishment were identical. Id.
at 348 n.1, 798 S.E.2d at 189 n.1.
146. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 189.
147. Id. at 348, 798 S.E.2d at 189.
148. Id. at 348-49, 798 S.E.2d at 189.
149. Id. at 349, 798 S.E.2d at 189.
150. Id. at 349, 798 S.E.2d at 189.
[Vol. 52:118
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
extent they are in derogation of the common law, such statutes
are strictly construed." 1 1 Virginia Code section 8.01-438 requires
the clerk to issue a certified copy of the order and have it served
on the judgment debtor and explicitly provides that "[t]he failure
to serve a copy of the order within sixty days from the date of en-
try thereof shall render the judgment void as to any debtor not so
served." 152 With such a "clearly self-executing" provision, the con-
fessed judgment was void after sixty days anyway because Flynn
was never actually served.153 "Accordingly, neither the nonsuit
nor the order declaring the judgment void nunc pro tunc had any
effect on the court's jurisdiction."154
Instead, the circuit court had jurisdiction to impose sanctions
or attorney's fees pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1,
which provides that a "signature of an attorney or party consti-
tutes a certificate . . . that . . . to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law." 55 Further-
more, "[i]f a pleading, motion or other paper is signed or made in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion, or upon its own ini-
tiative, shall impose upon the person who ... made the motion ...
an appropriate sanction." 156 The court noted that when Westlake
filed its garnishment in March 2015, "the sheriffs 'not found' re-
turn on the certified copy of the confessed judgment had been in
the clerk's records open to public view for over nine months" and
just "[a] few minutes of search would have revealed to the attor-
ney that the judgment was void for failure to comply with Code §
8.01-438."157 The court concluded that the "record before the cir-
cuit court at the hearing on September 4, 2015, contained evi-
dence of facts clearly sufficient to establish jurisdiction to consid-
er and award sanctions under this section." 15 8
151. Id. at 350, 798 S.E.2d at 190.
152. Id. at 349-50, 798 S.E.2d at 189-90 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-438 (Repl. Vol.
2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017)).
153. Id. at 350-51, 798 S.E.2d at 190.
154. Id. at 351, 798 S.E.2d at 190.
155. Id. at 351, 798 S.E.2d at 190 (emphasis added) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
271.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
156. Id. at 351, 798 S.E.2d at 190 (emphasis added) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
271.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015)). Of course, in this particular case, Flynn had moved for attorney's
fees.
157. Id. at 351-52, 798 S.E.2d at 190.
158. Id. at 351, 798 S.E.2d at 190.
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The supreme court quickly dispensed with Westlake's other as-
signments of error. Westlake's second and third assignments of
error relied on arguments it had only made in a motion for recon-
sideration filed nineteen days after the court's order awarding
sanctions. 159 "A motion to reconsider is insufficient to preserve an
argument not previously presented unless the record establishes
that the court had an opportunity to rule on the motion."160 Be-
cause the motion was never heard (or a hearing on it even re-
quested), the arguments were not preserved. 161 The fourth as-
signment of error argued that the circuit court abused its
discretion to the extent that "Flynn's pleadings were not neces-
sarily nor reasonably grounded in law" and her attorney's fees
"unsubstantiated."1 62 The court held that Westlake failed to iden-
tify a legal flaw in the pleadings and the circuit court did not
abuse discretion since Flynn filed an affidavit with the court
"specifying the hours devoted to the case and his charges there-
for." 16 3 The last assignment of error "was never presented to the
circuit court and [was] thus barred by Rule 5:25."164
The Supreme Court of Virginia summarized the case thusly:
"[Westlake] filed a suggestion in garnishment to divert [Flynn's]
wages in an effort to enforce a judgment that had been void by
operation of law for more than a year, a situation a reasonable
inquiry would have disclosed," which in turn "resulted in harm to
[Flynn] consisting of attorney's fees, costs and expenses including
those incurred by reason of the attorney's meritless appeal to this
Court."165 Clearly, the court wanted to make a statement. In addi-
tion to affirming the award, it "remand[ed] the case to [the cir-
cuit] court with direction, after due notice and hearing, to impose
such additional sanctions as the court finds appropriate to rec-
ompense [Flynn's] additional expenses, including reasonable at-
torney's fees, incurred by reason of this appeal." 6 6
159. Id. at 352, 798 S.E.2d at 191.
160. Id. at 352, 798 S.E.2d at 191 (citing Brandon v. Cox, 284 Va. 251, 256, 736 S.E.2d
695, 697 (2012)).
161. Id. at 352, 798 S.E.2d at 191.
162. Id. at 352, 798 S.E.2d at 191.
163. Id. at 352-53, 798 S.E.2d at 191.
164. Id. at 353, 798 S.E.2d at 191.
165. Id. at 353, 798 S.E.2d at 191 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 353, 798 S.E.2d at 191.
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II. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
A. Curing Signature Defects
The Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated Rule 1:5A that, ef-
fective August 1, 2017, allows for curing signature defects in a
variety of situations. 167 Pro se parties who failed to personally
sign a pleading and parties whose pleadings were not signed or
were signed by someone not authorized to practice law in Virgin-
ia, can now move the court for leave to properly sign the plead-
ing.168 Of course, the party making the motion must provide writ-
ten notice to the other parties. 169 The court has "sound discretion"
to decide such motions, but the motions "shall be liberally granted
in furtherance of the ends of justice."170 If granted by the court,
the properly signed pleading relates back to the date of original
filing. 171 However, the court may award fees and costs incurred by
a party, including reasonable attorney's fees, which a party in-
curred because of the defective signature. 172
The new rule also tolls the statute of limitations for complaints
that are dismissed because of a defective signature. 173 The statute
of limitations is now calculated in accordance with Virginia Code
section 8.01-229(E)(1), which, of course, tolls the statute of limita-
tions while a matter is pending.174
Finally, the new rule also allows for attorneys to save appeals
from circuit court that were not properly executed.175 Now, as
long as an attorney licensed to practice in Virginia properly en-
dorses and files a (late) notice of appeal within ninety days of the
167. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:5A, www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visit-
ed Sept. 27, 2017).
168. R. 1:5A(a), www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2017).
169. Id.
170. R. 1:5A(c), www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2017).
171. R. 1:5A(a), www.courts.state.va.us/courts/sev/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2017).
172. R. 1:5A(c), www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2017).
173. R. 1:5A(d), www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2017).
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
175. R. 1:5A(e), www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2017).
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original notice of appeal, the late notice will relate back to the
original notice.176
B. Exceptions to Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Orders
Rule 1:18 details pretrial scheduling orders. 177 Effective August
1, 2017, eminent domain cases are exempt from the requirement
that courts enter the Uniform Pretrial Scheduling Order unless
counsel for the parties agree otherwise or "the court, after provid-
ing an opportunity for counsel of record to be heard, makes a find-
ing that the scheduling order contained in the Appendix is not
consistent with the efficient and orderly administration of justice
under the specific circumstances of that case." 78 Previously, the
rule only exempted domestic relations cases.179 This change gives
eminent domain cases greater flexibility as to the scheduling or-
der.
C. Permitted Fonts for Supreme Court of Virginia
To the joy of all typography aficionados, the Supreme Court of
Virginia expanded the number of acceptable fonts for pleadings
submitted to the court. Previously, the court allowed only Couri-
er, Arial, or Verdana fonts.o80 In December 2016, Rule 5:6 was
amended to simply reference the supreme court's official website
for a list of permissible fonts.181 Currently, the list includes Arial,
Cambria, Century, Century School Book, Constantia, Courier
New, Franklin Gothic Book, Georgia, Palatino Linotype, Tahoma,
Times New Roman, and Verdana.1 82 The list greatly expands the
potential styles for pleadings, and many attorneys will likely pay
particular attention to which fonts maximize the number of words
per page to squeeze in the most argument.1 83
176. Id.
177. R. 1:18, www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
2017).
178. R. 1:18(C), www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2017).
179. See R. 1:18(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
180. R. 5:6(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
181. R. 5:6(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
182. List of Acceptable Fonts, SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, http://www.courts.state.
va.us/courts/scv/fontlist.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
183. Preliminarily, it appears that Times New Roman fits in the most words.
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D. Amicus Curiae Briefs
Rule 5:30 regarding amicus curiae briefs was significantly re-
vamped and went into effect on January 1, 2017.18 Previously,
the United States of America, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and
anyone with written consent of all parties could file an amicus
brief without leave of court.185 The current rule only exempts the
federal and state governments from seeking leave of court to file
an amicus brief.186 Anyone else must file a motion that indicates
whether the brief supports the appellant(s) or appellee(s) (or nei-
ther), certifies an attempt "to obtain consent of all parties to the
appeal," and "state[s] which, if any, of the parties has consented
to the motion."187 While seemingly a large change, written con-
sent of all parties was the exception rather than the rule, so this
change codifies existing reality rather than materially changing
appellate practice.
The new rule also clarifies the requirements for briefs not sup-
portive of any party. The rule now expressly provides that a brief
that does not support a party must be filed on or before the appel-
lant's deadline and "comply with all rules applicable to the appel-
lant." 188
E. Appeal Bonds
The Supreme Court of Virginia amended Rules 5A:17 and 5:24
regarding appeal bonds to clarify that deadlines for filing appeal
bonds are not jurisdictional. 189 Furthermore, the appeal bond
forms contained in the Appendix to Part V of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia were significantly updated in terms of
their substance.190 The forms now use contemporary language
and phrasing, which is much more understandable. Additionally,
the form includes a reminder that, pursuant to Virginia Code sec-
tions 1-205 and 8.01-676.1(S), cash may be deposited-waiving
the requirement for a corporate surety.191
184. R. 5:30 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
185. R. 5:30(b) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
186. R. 5:30(b) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
187. R. 5:30(c) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
188. R. 5:30(d)-(e) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
189. R. 5A:17 (Repl. Vol. 2017); R. 5:24 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
190. VA. SUP. CT. R. APPENDIX OF FORMs, PART FIVE (Repl. Vol. 2017).
191. Id.
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F. Exclusion of Witnesses
Rule 2:615 regarding the exclusion of witnesses was updated. It
now explicitly exempts as a matter of right "in an unlawful de-
tainer action filed in general district court, a managing agent as
defined in § 55-248.4" from a motion to exclude the witnesses. 192
For ease of reference, the statute defines managing agent as "a
person authorized by the landlord to act on behalf of the landlord
under an agreement." 193 While the author has never had such an
individual be previously excluded in an unlawful detainer action
or heard an argument that such an individual was not exempted
(under the "one officer or agent" language), the rule is now clear
on the issue. Although, one must note that by specifying "in gen-
eral district court," it appears that such an exemption would not
apply in circuit court.
III. NEW LEGISLATION
A. Timeline to File Appeals
Effective July 1, 2017, the General Assembly amended the
deadline for filing appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 19 4
Virginia Code section 8.01-671 now provides that the petition
must be filed within ninety days of the final order, as opposed to
the prior (less specific) deadline of "three months." 195 Be sure to
update your calendar (and deadlines) accordingly.
B. Determining an Indigent Party
Senate Bill 1305196 and House Bill 2328197 amended Virginia
Code section 17.1-606 regarding the waiver of fees and costs for
indigent parties. That section now specifies that it applies to
192. R. 2:615 (Repl. Vol. 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.4 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.4 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
194. Act of Mar. 20, 2017, ch. 651, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-671 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
195. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-671 (Cum. Supp. 2017), with VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-671 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
196. Act of Feb. 23, 2017, ch. 226, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 17.1-606 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
197. Act of Feb. 23, 2017, ch. 227, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 17.1-606 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
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plaintiffs who are residents of the Commonwealth and any de-
fendant in a civil case regardless of residency. 198 The new lan-
guage also waives fees for indigent out-of-state defendants, as the
prior language only applied to residents of the Commonwealth
(without distinguishing plaintiffs from defendants). 199 The section
now requires the court, "[i]n determining a person's inability to
pay ... [to] consider the factors set forth in subsection B of [Vir-
ginia Code] § 19.2-159."200
As a reminder, under Virginia Code section 19.2-159(B), a par-
ty is presumptively indigent if the party is a "current recipient of
a state or federally funded program for the indigent." 201 If the
party is not a recipient of such funds, then the court undergoes "a
thorough examination of the financial resources of the [party],"
which includes an analysis of net income, all assets, and excep-
tional expenses. 202 The party is indigent if, after subtracting ex-
ceptional expenses from the net income and all assets, the re-
mainder is "equal to or below 125 percent of the federal poverty
income guidelines prescribed for the size of the household of the
[party] by the federal Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices."203
C. Attorney Discipline Procedure
The procedure for a court's handling of attorney discipline was
significantly amended in February 2017.204 Virginia Code section
54.1-395 now provides that "[a]ny attorney who is the subject of a
disciplinary proceeding or the Virginia State Bar [("VSB")] may
elect to terminate the proceeding before the Bar Disciplinary
Board or a district committee and demand that further proceed-
ings be conducted by a three-judge circuit court." 2 05 If so termi-
nated, the VSB must "file a complaint in a circuit court where
venue is proper," and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
198. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-606 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
199. Compare id. § 17.1-606 (Cum. Supp. 2017), with id. § 17.1-606 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
200. Id. § 17.1-606 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
201. Id. § 19.2-159(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
202. Id.
203. Id. (defining what the court should consider as under net income, all assets, and
exceptional expenses).
204. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 91, 2017 Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-3935 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3935(A) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
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Virginia "shall designate the three-judge circuit court, which
shall consist of three circuit court judges of circuits other than the
circuit in which the case is pending, to hear and decide the
case."
206
D. Legal Malpractice Statute of Limitations
In another response to a Supreme Court of Virginia decision,
namely Thorsen v. Richmond SPCA, 207 the General Assembly de-
leted half of Virginia Code section 64.2-520 and enacted Virginia
Code section 64.2-520.1.208 The new section still provides that
"[a]n action for damages ... resulting from legal malpractice con-
cerning the individual's estate planning ... shall accrue upon
completion of the representation during which the malpractice
occurred." 209 However, the statute no longer includes language al-
lowing a malpractice action to be "maintained pursuant to § 8.01-
281 by the grantor or by the grantor's personal representative or
the trustee if such damages are incurred after the grantor's
death."210
More important (and in direct response to the Thorsen deci-
sion), the new statute provides that without a "written agreement
between the individual and the defendant that expressly grants
standing to a person who is not a party to the representation by
specific reference to this subsection, the action may be main-
tained only by the individual or by the individual's personal rep-
resentative."211 This language directly overrules the holding in
Thorsen finding that the Richmond SPCA had standing to sue for
damages. 212
206. Id.
207. 292 Va. 257, 786 S.E.2d 453 (2016).
208. Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 43, 2017 Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-520, -520.1 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
209. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-520.1 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
210. Compare id. § 64.2-520(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017), with id. § 64.2-520(B) (Repl. Vol.
2012).
211. Id. § 64.2-520.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
212. As a brief refresher, the plaintiff, Richmond SPCA, sued for damages from legal
malpractice where a third party's will bequeathing property to the Richmond SPCA as
drafted by the defendant only bequeathed tangible personal property, as opposed to all
property as intended by the third party, to the Richmond SPCA. Thorsen, 292 Va. at 263,
786 S.E.2d at 457, 463.
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E. Severing Tenancy by the Entirety
In a response to Evans v. Evans,213 the General Assembly
amended Virginia Code section 55-20.2.214 The statute now ex-
pressly provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute,
no interest in real property held as tenants by the entireties shall
be severed by written instrument unless the instrument is a deed
signed by both spouses as grantors."215 This new language over-
rules the holding in Evans.216
213. 290 Va. 176, 772 S.E.2d 576 (2015).
214. Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 38, 2017 Acts _, _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.2
(Cum. Supp. 2017)).
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
216. Evans, 290 Va. at 185, 187, 722 S.E.2d at 581-82 (finding sufficient evidence to
establish mutual consent by the parties to a tenancy by the entirety to convert that tenan-
cy to a fee simple in one of the parties). The court held "that a husband's transfer of rights
to his wife was sufficient to sever the tenancy by the entirety, even though his wife was
only the grantee, not a grantor." Id. at 185, 722 S.E.2d at 581-82.
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